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                            The Military as a Learning Organisation: 
                 Establishing the Fundamentals of Best-Practice in Lessons-Learned 
The post-Cold War era has witnessed the rapid expansion of organisational learning initiatives 
within NATO militaries, especially formal ‘lessons-learned’ processes. The effectiveness of 
national lessons-learned processes in recalibrating military activity to the demands of ongoing 
operations has been highly-differentiated. However, the academic literature on military 
change and practitioner guidance, notably the NATO Lesson-Learned Handbook, has been 
slow to investigate the key features of best-practice in military learning. This article breaks 
new ground by drawing upon the literature on dynamic organisational capabilities to explore 
the fundamental organisational processes and activities which are necessary to implement 
successful lessons-learned. It examines, in particular, the organisational features which 
facilitate ‘knowledge transformation’: the effective combination of new knowledge gained from 
intra- and inter-organisational learning with existing organisational knowledge. The article 
concludes by highlighting several potential future empirical and theoretical research agendas 
in military learning and the importance of engagement between lessons-learned practitioners 
and organisational learning scholars. 
Keywords: dynamic organisational capabilities; knowledge transformation; lessons-learned; 
military learning; NATO Lessons-Learned Handbook. 
Introduction: exploring the organisational processes and activities which facilitate 
military learning 
Technological and conceptual advances in organisational learning have enabled the 
establishment of formal, permanent learning processes within NATO militaries since the end 
of the Cold War (Dyson 2012, Foley at al. 2011, Marcus 2015, 2017). These so-called ‘lessons-
learned’ processes have the potential to improve adaption, innovation and emulation by 
allowing the institutional military to more effectively tailor key areas of activity to the demands 
of the operational environment (Marcus, 2015, 2017, Serena 2011, p.161).1 However, national 
lessons-learned processes display differentiation in terms of their organisational features and 
their effectiveness in recalibrating military activity in the light of operational experiences 
(Dyson 2012). 
This article breaks new ground by examining the insights of the literature on organisational 
learning about the central features which should characterise best-practice in such formalised 
military learning processes. It establishes an ‘ideal type’ of the organisational processes and 
activities which should underpin lessons-learned at the tactical and operational levels of 
conflict. The concept of the ideal type was first developed by Max Weber (1922). As the Oxford 
Dictionary of Sociology notes: ‘ideal types are worked out with reference to the real world, but 
involve a selection of those elements that are most rational or which fit together in the most 
rational way’. The ideal type allows us to consider ‘…what course human action of a certain 
kind would take, if it were strictly purposive-rationally oriented, undisturbed by error or 
emotions’ (Weber 1922, p.4).  
                                                          
1 Militaries can be conceived of as consisting of two main organisational components: the ‘institutional military’, 
which refers to the military organisations involved in training, equipping and ensuring the readiness of the military 
and the ‘operational military’, which consists of the organisations and personnel prepared for deployment. 
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In developing an ‘ideal type’ of military learning the article explores, in particular, the insights 
of the literature on dynamic organisational capabilities. The concept of dynamic organisational 
capabilities refers to an organisation’s ability ‘to integrate, build, and reconfigure internal and 
external competencies to address rapidly changing environments’ and thereby ‘achieve new 
and innovative forms of competitive advantage’ (Teece et al 1997, p.516). It allows us to add 
greater detail to existing academic scholarship on military learning by uncovering the key 
processes and activities which facilitate effective formal organisational learning processes. In 
particular, the literature on dynamic organisational capabilities helps sheds light on how 
military adaptation in the field can be encouraged while simultaneously ensuring the 
integration of bottom-up learning into wider institutional military activities.  
The article does not claim that lessons-learned provide a panacea for the failure of military 
organisations to adapt, innovate and emulate effectively. As the literature on military change 
demonstrates, variables such as bureaucratic politics, organisational culture and socio-
psychological factors can form powerful impediments to the integration of new knowledge 
arising from operational experiences (Davidson 2011, p.26, Farrell 2005, Posen 1984, Rosen 
1991). However, recent scholarship on military learning (Catignani 2014, Foley et al 2011, 
Marcus 2015, 2017, Serena 2011, p.161) demonstrates that well-organised learning processes 
can provide an important means to introduce disruptive thought to militaries and challenge 
existing orthodoxies. Well-organised lessons-learned also provide an essential opportunity to 
ensure that learning does not remain ‘siloed’ within communities of practice, but can be 
disseminated across the wider military organisation where appropriate (Kollars et al 2016, 
pp.1061-62). Understanding the fundamental features of effective formal learning mechanisms 
is, therefore, a vital first step towards improving the capacity of military organisations to adapt, 
emulate and innovate (Hoffmann 2016, p.138). 
The article begins by exploring the potential of formal learning processes to improve 
adaptation, innovation and emulation and identifies a neglect by existing scholarship on 
military change of the organisational processes and activities which support learning. It 
proceeds by examining the insights of organisational learning about how an organisation can 
facilitate knowledge transformation: the ability of an organisation to effectively combine new 
and existing organisational knowledge. The article concludes by reflecting upon the avenues 
for future empirical and theoretical research on military learning and points in particular, to the 
importance of improved engagement between academics and practitioners involved in lessons-
learned. 
Why lessons-learned processes matter: the potential to improve adaptation, innovation 
and emulation 
As Farrell (2010, p.569) highlights, military adaptation involves ‘change to tactics, techniques 
or existing technologies to improve operational performance’, while innovation is 
characterised by ‘a major change that is institutionalised in new doctrine, a new organisational 
structure and/or a new technology’. Adaptation and innovation exist on a continuum (Farrell et 
al. 2013, p.7). For example, significant change can take place within a military without its 
formal institutionalisation as reform to existing routines through doctrinal change. Such 
learning can be considered ‘advanced adaptation’ (Stulberg and Salomone 2007, p.28). 
Furthermore, military adaptation in the field also contributes to successful military emulation 
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by delivering evidence which can verify the relevance of other states’ experiences (Dyson 
2017, p.3; Resende-Santos 2007, pp.58-61). 
Military adaptation and its relationship with innovation and emulation is under-explored in the 
literature on military change, which also neglects the role of formal learning processes in 
military change (Catignani 2012, p.516, Farrell 2010, pp.591-92, Grissom 2006, p.908). For 
example, while Farrell (2010) explores the conditions which facilitate adaptation in the field, 
he does not examine the transmission belt linking adaptation and changes to the institutional 
military. This transmission belt is essential in avoiding an ‘adaptation trap’ where learning by 
individuals and groups is not codified as organisational learning (Catignani 2014, Farrell 2010, 
p.591, Serena 2011, p.163). As Day (1994, p.44) notes: ‘Organizations without practical 
mechanisms to remember what has worked and why will have to repeat their failures and 
rediscover their success formulas over and over again’. Without changes to areas of 
institutional military activity, such as training, equipment, personnel, information, concepts 
and doctrine, organisational, infrastructure, logistics and operational design, adaptation in the 
field will have only a limited positive impact on military effectiveness.  
It is possible to distinguish between two main forms of military learning. First, informal 
learning processes, where lessons are disseminated through informal social networks. They 
tend to focus on short-term, ad-hoc problem solving and seldom result in advanced adaptation 
or innovation (Catignani 2012, p.521, Zahra and George 2002, p.193). Second, formal lessons-
learned, which involve creating institutional structures and processes to identify, manage, 
evaluate and implement the lessons of operations for key areas of military activity. 
The key function of lessons-learned is succinctly expressed by the NATO Allied Joint Doctrine 
for the Conduct of Operations. It should, if implemented successfully, allow a military to ‘learn 
efficiently from experience and to provide validated justifications for amending the existing 
way of doing things, in order to improve performance, both during the course of an operation 
and for subsequent operations (Dyson 2017, p.3).2 Lessons-learned allows a military to identify 
individual lessons-learned which, as Secchi et al (1999, p.58) highlight, involve:  
‘…a knowledge or understanding gained by experience. The experience may be positive, as in 
a successful test or mission, or negative, as in a mishap or failure. A lesson must be significant 
in that it has a real or assumed impact on operations; valid in that is factually and technically 
correct; and applicable in that it identifies a specific design, process, or decision that reduces 
or eliminates the potential for failures and mishaps, or reinforces a positive result.’  
Lessons-learned are not a new development. Semi-formal and informal learning processes have 
been established during military campaigns throughout history: by the German Army in WW1, 
the German Ostheer, US 12th Army Group and British 8th Army during WW2 (Foley 2014, 
pp.287-90, Mains and Ad Ariely 2012, p.166). These lessons processes were discontinued 
following the end of the campaigns in which they developed. They were also undermined by 
deficits in their conceptual organisation and practical difficulties associated with gathering and 
disseminating lessons in the pre-digital era (Dyson 2017, p.4; Mains and Ad Ariely 2012, 
pp.166-67).  
                                                          
2 AJP-3 (B), Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations, NATO, March 2011, 0454. 
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However, during the 1980s and post-Cold War era, improvements in Information Technology 
have established the foundation for more efficient transmission, storage and retrieval of 
information (Mains and Ad Ariely 2012, p.168). Furthermore, the potential of new military 
technologies can only be properly exploited when accompanied by innovation in operational 
concepts and organisational change (Krepinevic 1994, p.30). Since the late 1970s the 
development of the literature on organisational learning has dramatically improved our 
understanding of the key organisational processes and activities which facilitate adaptation and 
learning. This context of conceptual and technological innovation led to the establishment, for 
the first time, of permanent lessons-learned processes within NATO states from the early-2000s 
(Catignani 2014, Dyson 2012, Foley et al. 2011, Lis 2012, 2014). 
Despite these developments, NATO militaries have encountered significant difficulties in 
reflecting upon the implications of operational experiences and in implementing change 
(Catignani 2014, Dyson 2012). These problems have led some scholars to be dismissive about 
the capacity of lessons-learned to contribute to military change. Farrell (2010, p.572) posits 
that lessons-learned simply reinforce organisational routines and discourage exploration of new 
ideas, while Grissom (2006, p.926) argues that lessons-learned can only assist with information 
gathering.  
However, several scholars demonstrate that effective intra-organisational learning through 
formal learning mechanisms is possible during conflict. As Marcus (2015, 2017) highlights in 
his research on Israeli Defence Forces lessons-learned, it is possible to establish a smooth 
transmission belt from adaptation in the field to reforms to doctrine, training and operational 
design. Downie (1998, pp.260-65) also makes several recommendations about how the US 
military might improve its organisational learning capability. Furthermore, Russell (2010) 
demonstrates the importance of effective lessons-learned in US Army and Marine Corps 
adaptation during the Iraq War, while Catignani (2012, p.537) recognises how lessons-learned 
can create the conditions for effective bottom-up adaptation and innovation. Egnell (2011, 
p.313) also notes how a ‘well-oiled system for capturing and distributing lessons-learned’ can 
facilitate military adaptation and innovation. Finally, in their scholarship on knowledge 
management in militaries, Jones and Mahon (2012) demonstrate the vital importance of formal 
structures to develop, maintain and transfer tacit knowledge. 
The importance of effective individual, group and organisational learning has been magnified 
by the experiences of NATO militaries in contemporary counterinsurgency operations. A 
number of variables during ISAF conspired to make it more difficult for militaries to ‘learn at 
their own pace’ through informal processes (Ucko and Egnell 2013, pp.14-15). These factors 
include the growing intensity of media coverage, dwindling home- and host-country patience 
with expeditionary operations, as well as the capacity of insurgents to exploit technological 
advances to decentralise, network and adapt. In short, a military which is unable to undertake 
effective intra-organisational learning faces likely defeat in contemporary operations (Foley et 
al. 2011, p.254, Russell 2010, pp.88-89).  
Inter-organisational learning is also a vital dimension of military effectiveness. Learning from 
organisations confronting similar problems forms an important means to overcome reliance on 
existing organisational knowledge (Pedler et al. 1989, p.7, Sheremata 2000, p.396). It provides 
a vital opportunity to draw upon a richer experience base and encounter novel and emerging 
ideas (Foley 2014, p.297). The importance of knowledge acquisition from foreign militaries is 
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well-recognised in accounts of military change (Resende-Santos 2007, p.73). However, 
emulation is not automatic and should be cultivated by an institutional commitment to 
systematically gathering information from alliance partners about proven success in different 
areas of military activity. Yet, the role of lessons-learned as a tool for enhancing the 
effectiveness of inter-organisational learning at the tactical and operational levels of conflict 
remains underexplored in the academic literature on emulation (Coticchia and Moro 2016, 
pp.710-12; Horowitz 2010. 
Hence dismissing formal learning processes on the basis of the difficulties that NATO and 
coalition militaries have encountered in developing and exploiting lessons-learned in Iraq and 
Afghanistan is misguided. It is too early in the development of lessons-learned to reject their 
potential. Moreover, failing to study military learning processes would not only be to the 
detriment of military studies, but would also deny the growing academic literature on learning 
processes in public organisations an important case study (Piening 2013).  
The fundamental features of military lessons-learned have received limited attention in the 
academic literature. Catignani (2014), Foley et al (2011) and Marcus (2015, 2017) provide 
fascinating case studies of the development of contemporary military learning processes, but 
spend relatively little time considering the core features of lessons-learned best-practice.3 A 
significant body of scholarship exists which examines the relationship between organisational 
learning and military effectiveness.4 Yet, these scholars do not engage sufficiently with the rich 
literature on organisational learning. Crucially, they do not exploit its full potential to provide 
insights into the organisational processes and activities which support effective learning.  
As Catignani (2014, p.60) recognises, further research is necessary to:  
‘…explore what institutional configurations could help improve the Army’s ability to 
extrapolate more efficiently the operational experiences that have been shared by personnel 
through informal networks and transform them into more enduring organizational knowledge 
and, thus, achieve higher-level learning’. 
Dynamic organisational capabilities and lessons-learned: best-practice in military 
learning  
The purpose of this section is to fill the gap in our understanding of military learning processes 
by mapping the key organisational activities and processes underpinning effective lessons-
learned. In doing so, it draws upon the peer-reviewed academic literature on organisational 
learning in the business and military contexts. As McIntyre et al (2003, p.38) note, the theory 
of knowledge management differs little between the business and military contexts. Militaries 
and firms both operate in competitive, fast-changing contexts where the failure to adapt, 
emulate and innovate can be punished with severe penalties. For a firm, these penalties can 
take the form of job losses and bankruptcy. In the case of the military, they are harsher: the loss 
of civilian and military lives, a decrease in the relative power of the state and its possible 
destruction (Thomas and Allen 2006, p.124). There are also parallels to be drawn between the 
governance of military and business organisations, particularly between the principal/agent 
                                                          
3 Marcus (2017, pp.5-9) provides an interesting, but brief examination of the core features of ‘organisational 
learning capacity’ which relies heavily on the existing literature on military learning. 
4 See, for example, Downie (1998), Davidson (2011), Fitzgerald (2013), Nagl (2002), Russell (2010) and Serena 
(2011). 
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relationship of shareholders and managers/employees and the relationship of civilian and 
military actors. Hence, while the literature on dynamic organisational capabilities has 
developed predominantly in the business context, it provides a rich foundation for considering 
the organisational activities and processes which can foster adaptation, advanced adaptation or 
innovation within militaries (McIntyre et al. 2003). 
This section also examines guidance on lessons-learned best-practice contained in the third 
edition of the NATO Lessons-Learned Handbook, released by the Joint Analysis and Lessons 
Learned Centre (JALLC) in February 2016. The JALLC opened in 2002 and attained full 
operational capability in 2006. It is NATO’s main organisation for the Joint analysis of 
operations, exercises, training and experiments and the NATO-wide dissemination of Joint 
lessons. The JALLC is also tasked with assisting NATO states in developing their lessons-
learned capabilities. Its Lessons-Learned Handbook attempts to address the main processes and 
activities which permit military organisations to capture, analyse and share lessons (NATO 
Lessons-Learned Handbook 2016, p.8). This section incorporates the key guidance contained 
within the Handbook and points to several very important organisational processes and 
activities which do not receive attention in the document.  
Finally, this section includes the insights of interviews conducted with British and German 
Service and Joint level lessons-learned personnel, as well as the broader intellectual 
architecture of the British and German armed forces. These interviews are used to supplement 
the academic literature by shedding light on areas of best-practice in lessons-learned not 
addressed by existing scholarship on dynamic organisational capabilities and military affairs. 
The capability to acquire, manage, disseminate and transform knowledge  
The concept of dynamic organisational capabilities focuses on the effective use of resources 
and competencies by an organisation to generate greater value than its competitors and attain 
a competitive advantage (Zahra and George 2002, p.188). The scholarship on dynamic 
organisational capabilities overlaps with the literature on ‘absorptive capacity’ which explores 
an organisation’s ability to ‘identify, assimilate and exploit knowledge from the external 
environment’ (Cohen and Levinthal 1989, pp.569-70).  
Dynamic organisational capabilities recognises that the human elements of an organisation are 
central to its success. It explores how knowledge acquisition and the management of 
knowledge and learning processes enhances an organisation’s ability to adapt to its strategic 
environment. Furthermore, dynamic organisational capabilities examines the role of formal and 
informal organisational assets, such as organisational routines, norms and practises, in 
bolstering organisational performance (Dyson 2017, p.6; Teece et al 1997, pp.514-15). It 
provides an excellent framework to explore the key organisational activities and processes 
which are necessary to stimulate learning at the individual, group and organisational levels.  
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Figure 1: The NATO Lessons-Learned Process5 
 
 
As the NATO Lessons-Learned Handbook (2016, pp.10-13) highlights, lessons-learned are 
characterised by four basic stages (Figure 1). First, the creation of an observation that highlights 
an area of military activity that may be improved. An observation is defined as: ‘a comment 
based on something someone has heard, seen or noticed that has been identified and 
documented as an issue for improvement or a potential best-practice’ (NATO Lessons-Learned 
Handbook 2016, p.11). An observation then enters the second stage of lessons-learned: the 
analysis stage where the seriousness of the problem is ascertained and, if necessary, solutions 
for improvement are identified (known as a ‘remedial action’). This stage also identifies the 
appropriate body/bodies which should be tasked with addressing the problem (Dyson 2017, 
p.5-6).  
Once these tasks have been completed, a Lesson Identified (LI) has been achieved. As the 
Handbook (2016, p.12) notes, a LI forms ‘a mature observation with a determined root cause 
of the observed issue and a recommended remedial action and action body, which has been 
developed and proposed to the appropriate authority’. In addition to LI, a best-practice may 
also be identified by the lessons-learned process. A best-practice is ‘a technique, process or 
methodology that contributes to the improved performance of an organization and has been 
identified as a best way of operating in a particular area as compared to other good practice(s)’ 
(NATO Lessons-Learned Handbook 2016, 12). Best-practices are often only relevant to a 
specific operation and can rapidly become obsolete (NATO Lessons-Learned Handbook 2016, 
p.12). Hence they may not necessitate formal organisational change (i.e. change to doctrine), 
but rather adaptation among certain individuals or groups within the military and are especially 
relevant for pre-deployment training (Dyson 2017, p.5). 
Following the identification of a LI, the ‘remedial action stage’ begins, which involves, first of 
all, endorsement and tasking, where a LI is formally endorsed by the leadership of the lessons-
                                                          
5 (NATO Lessons-Learned Handbook 2016, p.11) 
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learned organisation. One or more ‘action bodies’ (i.e. military branch/organisation) are tasked 
with implementing a remedial action. The action body must then prepare a plan of action for 
the implementation of the LI and provide regular updates on its progress to the lessons-learned 
organisation. Validation will then take place, which should ensure that a measurable 
improvement has resulted from the remedial action phase (NATO Lessons-Learned Handbook 
2016, pp.12-13). Once validation is completed, a LI become a lesson-learned (LL), defined as 
‘an improved capability or increased performance’ (NATO Lessons-Learned Handbook 2016, 
p.13). The LL then enters the final stage of the lessons-learned process: dissemination among 
relevant stakeholders within (and sometimes outside) the military.   
Building upon Zahra and Georges’ (2002, pp.189-90) four dimensions of absorptive capacity, 
the article argues that four dynamic organisational capabilities are necessary to effectively 
accomplish the above stages of the lessons-learned process. First of all, knowledge acquisition 
capability, which involves the capability to effectively acquire information and knowledge 
from the operational environment and alliance partners. Second, knowledge management 
capability, which refers the capability to exploit advances in IT hardware and software to 
facilitate the acquisition, storage, retrieval and dissemination of information and knowledge. 
The third capability is knowledge dissemination, which denotes the practical capability of a 
military to distribute individual lessons-learned or best-practices to key stakeholders within 
and outside the military. 
Knowledge acquisition, management and dissemination capabilities are essential components 
of formal learning processes and collectively establish ‘Potential Absorptive Capacity’ 
(PACAP) where an organisation is able to acquire and assimilate knowledge (Zahra and George 
2002).6 However knowledge transformation, which refers to an organisation’s ability to exploit 
knowledge by effectively combining existing organisational knowledge with new knowledge, 
is the key determinant of whether an organisation will fully realise its potential to absorb 
knowledge (Zahra and George 2002, p.190). Hence the following section focuses on the key 
features of a well-developed knowledge transformation capability. 
Knowledge transformation: establishing an organisational culture of experimentation and 
creativity  
The capability to transform knowledge by establishing and improving the processes which 
allow an organisation to successfully combine new and existing knowledge is essential to the 
remedial action phase of lessons-learned (Zahra and George 2002, 190). It helps an 
organisation bridge the gap between knowing that change is required and enacting change (de 
Long and Fahey 2000, Pfeffer and Sutton 2000, Wilson et al. 2007, pp.1045-46). As Dawson 
(2000, p.326) highlights: ‘People may have the infrastructure and ability to share knowledge 
and work effectively with others within knowledge processes, however they also require the 
motivation to do so, and ultimately this depends on the organisational culture…’.   
An organisation should, therefore, be capable of ‘unlearning’ by persistently challenging 
organisational knowledge (Hjalager 1999, p.24).  As Nagl (2002, p.219) argues: 
                                                          
6 For an exploration of best-practice in knowledge acquisition, management and dissemination, as well as 
further detail about the organisational activities and processes which underpin knowledge transformation in a 
military context, please see Dyson (forthcoming, 2019). 
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 ‘The very organisational culture that makes an institution effective in one area may blind it to 
the possibility that its strengths in the field are crippling deficiencies in a different situation, 
the more debilitating for being so deeply rooted in the culture that they are never even 
recognised, much less questioned’.  
Hence, effective knowledge transformation is critically dependent upon the efforts that an 
organisation makes to establish a culture of experimentation and creativity which can challenge 
existing orthodoxies (de Long and Fahey 2000, p.125, Harvey and Wilkinson 2009, p.30, 
Hoffmann 2016, p.138; Murovec and Prodan 2009, p.862, Pedler et al. 1989, p.7, Weber 2007, 
p.336). In the absence of a culture of experimentation and creativity, knowledge acquisition, 
management and dissemination activities are likely to be underused or to reinforce existing 
organisational knowledge and routines (Dawson 2000, p.326, de Long and Fahey 2000, Pfeffer 
and Sutton 2000). 
The creation of a culture of experimentation and creativity is important not only in facilitating 
advanced adaptation and innovation, but also in encouraging adaptation in the field. For 
example, Farrell (2010, p.573) and Harkness and Hunzeker (2015, p.6) argue that frequent 
personnel turnover in the field is an important driver of adaptation by providing an opportunity 
for the influx of new ideas. However, personnel turnover alone does not improve adaptation. 
Rather, it can undermine adaptation as new personnel may attempt to demonstrate their ability 
to apply existing organisational knowledge more effectively (King 2010, p.325). Only where a 
wider culture of experimentation and creativity is present, particularly one which encourages 
inter-organisational learning, will personnel turnover lead to the influx of new ideas (Foley 
2014, p.297, Hjalager, 1999, pp.23-33). Moreover, regular personnel turnover during 
stabilisation and counterinsurgency operations, creates a risk that personnel have insufficient 
time to establish the relationships with local leaders required for effective intelligence-
gathering (Marston 2010, pp.77-78). 
The development of an effective knowledge transformation capability receives little attention 
in the NATO Lessons-Learned Handbook. It recognises the difficulty of establishing a culture 
where individuals feel comfortable sharing knowledge (2016, p.2) and highlights some barriers 
to lesson sharing, including embarrassment or blame (2016, p.38). However, the Handbook 
focuses on highly-technical guidance, rather than the wider steps that military organisations 
can take to establish an organisational culture that is supportive of lessons-learned. It contains 
no systematic analysis of the insights that organisational learning literature can shed on how 
military organisations might overcome knowledge-sharing difficulties by fostering a culture of 
experimentation and creativity.  
Building upon the survey of literature on organisational culture and learning undertaken by 
Martins and Terblanche (2003), this sub-section argues that four key dimensions of 
organisational culture promote experimentation and creativity. First, it is important that the 
values of creativity and experimentation are clearly embedded within organisational strategy 
and that such values are internalised by personnel (Lis 2012, p.22, Marsick and Watkins 2003, 
Martins and Terblanche, 2003, p.69, Pedler 1989, p.4, Senge 1990, p.139). Hence  education 
and training should develop officers’ capacity to think in a creative and critical manner (Jones 
and Mahon 2012, pp.78-81, Murovec and Prodan 2009, p.861).  
The qualities traditionally understood as essential to tactical level military activity include 
discipline, obedience, loyalty and conformity (Kiszely 2013, p.129). However, the need to 
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apply mission command – especially relevant in scenarios encountered in counterinsurgency, 
stabilisation and hybrid warfare – requires that tactical-level military personal exhibit qualities 
traditionally viewed as necessary for the operational level of conflict: creativity, initiative, 
intellect and critical thought (Kiszely 2013, p.129).7 Consequently, officer education and 
training should strike a careful balance between these competing qualities. Education and 
training must endow officers and soldiers with the capacity to demonstrate critical thought and 
initiative, and recognise when it is appropriate to do so.     
The structure of an organisation forms the second main dimension of encouraging an 
organisational culture of experimentation and creativity (Martins and Terblanche 2003, pp.69-
70). Several values and norms related to organisational structure impact upon creativity and 
experimentation. Organisations which promote values such as flexibility, autonomy and 
cooperation between and within teams display greater levels of creativity and adaptation than 
organisations which inculcate values of order, predictability and hierarchy (Farrell 2010, 
pp.572-73, Marsick and Watkins 2003). As Judge et al (1997, pp.72-85) note, a learning 
organisation should be characterised by ‘chaos within guidelines’.  
Delegating authority for problem-solving to the lower levels of an organisation allows it to take 
decisions at levels where knowledge about problems is most developed (Harkness and 
Hunzeker 2015, 6, Sheremata 2000, p.395). Furthermore, empowering leaders at the lower 
levels of organisational hierarchy is also important as they play a vital role in promoting 
creativity and adaptation (Sheremata 2000, p.399). They are especially well-placed to motivate 
individual and group creativity and adaptation, to acquire information from their team and 
disseminate it within an organisation (Sheremata 2000, p.399).  
These observations reinforce the importance of mission command (DiBella 2010, p.121, 
Macrus 2017, p.7).  As Serena (2011, p.172) notes of leadership in counterinsurgency: 
‘Empowering leaders to experiment with TTPs to appropriately adapt to local conditions is a 
staple element of successful operations…this capability is crucial in operations where the 
spectrum of tasks is nearly infinite and timely guidance is likely to be in short supply’. Russell 
(2010, pp.200-01) also demonstrates the importance of flat organisational hierarchies and the 
delegation of authority for effective individual and group adaptation in the field. 
However, the delegation of problem-solving to lower levels of command can create a situation 
where important instances of adaptation with wider relevance remain informal and do not 
translate into advanced adaptation or innovation (Catignani 2014, Farrell 2010, p.591, 
Sheremata, 2000, p.396). Hence, a commitment to a degree of ‘chaos’ should be accompanied 
by engagement with lessons-learned (Judge et al 1997, pp.72-85, Ucko and Egnell 2013, 
p.146). In particular, soldiers should be taught about the importance of lessons-learned 
throughout their training and officer education (Lis 2012, p.22, Lis 2014, pp.71-74, Sheremata 
2000, p.397).  
Such training also contributes to a sense of personal ownership of doctrine across the military, 
which is vital in facilitating critical engagement with existing organisational knowledge. As 
Downie (1998, p.262) notes of doctrine development: ‘…military institutions should make 
                                                          
7 The principle of mission command involves the delegation of a significant level of responsibility for tactical-
level decision-making to lower-levels of command, particularly to platoon and company commanders in order to 
enhance flexibility in realising their commander’s intent.  
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their members feel that their personal experience is an integral part of the process. Doctrine 
cannot be seen only as a set of ideas or concepts written by the agency responsible for 
publishing doctrine’. A sense of ownership of doctrine is not only important in ensuring that 
doctrine remains relevant to current operations, but also in ensuring that soldiers and officers 
perceive it as such (Harvey and Wilkinson 2009, p.29, Marsick and Watkins 2003). 
The third dimension of organisational culture which supports experimentation and creativity is 
support mechanisms, especially reward and time (Edmonson 1999, p.356, Martins and 
Tereblanche 2003, pp.71-72, Yong-Mi et al. 2012, p.481). It is important that a military 
provides employees with sufficient time to be creative and innovate (Pedler et al. 1989, p.7). 
As Garvin et al (2008, p.3) note: ‘Supportive learning environments allow time for a pause in 
the action and encourage thoughtful review of the organization’s processes’. Hence personnel 
not only require time between tours for reflection, but it is also important that sufficient 
personnel are deployed in the field to reduce the operational tempo for units and permit 
engagement with lessons-learned knowledge acquisition activities. 
Creative behaviour by individuals, including experimentation and risk-taking, should also be 
rewarded by an organisation’s promotion framework (Byrne and Bannister 2013, pp.83-84, Lis 
2012, p.25, Pfeffer and Sutton 2000). Linking promotion with experimentation and risk-taking 
plays an important role in reducing the personal risk that individuals feel they are exposing 
themselves to through creative behaviour and knowledge-sharing (Edmonson 1999, p.351). 
Furthermore, knowledge can confer power upon individuals and groups and form a powerful 
disincentive to knowledge-sharing (Byrne and Bannister 2013, p.91). Hence military 
organisations should ensure that individuals and groups responsible for serious instances of 
information and knowledge-hoarding are held to account.  
Fourth, organisational culture should support behaviour that encourages soldiers in the field to 
report problems and successes (Martins and Terblanche 2003, p.72, Pedler et al. 1989, p.7). 
Effective feedback from personnel, especially tacit knowledge-sharing, helps to promote 
innovation within and between teams (Pedler et al. 1989, p.7, Thomas and Allen 2006, p.126). 
Participation in knowledge-sharing activities can be encouraged through a number of means.  
The use of online and face-to-face fora allowing sub-communities of practice to interact and 
holding intermediary after-action reviews are key activities in facilitating the socialisation of 
tacit knowledge. In addition, troops should be encouraged to communicate with platoon and 
company commanders their positive and negative experiences of the utility of existing doctrine, 
in both individual and group discussions (Wilson et al. 2007, p.1047).  
Military education and training must, therefore, endow soldiers with a solid command of 
existing doctrine. Farrell (2010, p.571-73) and Harkness and Hunzeker (2015, p.7) argue that 
poor organisational memory facilitates adaptation. However, limited doctrine leads to the poor 
institutionalisation of key principles of warfare and does not equip personnel with the 
knowledge necessary to identify potential solutions to problems. As Høiback (2016, p.192) 
demonstrates, higher-tactical and operational level doctrine provides a foundation for a 
common understanding about operational concepts, operational design and tactical-level 
decision-making.  
Crucially, poor organisational memory can promote ignorance of historical experiences, 
forcing soldiers to relearn important lessons in the field, sometimes at great cost (Catignani 
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2014, pp.41-42, p.59). The core role of doctrine should, therefore, be to provide a foundation 
for critical thinking (Harvey and Wilkinson 2009, p.30). Militaries should encourage the 
parallel emerge of a strong organisational memory alongside a culture of experimentation and 
creativity in order to ensure that doctrine is adapted to operational circumstances (Kiszely 
2006, p.19) Lessons-learned processes which facilitate inter-organisational learning are 
especially important in ensuring an appropriate balance between the exploitation of existing 
organisational knowledge and experimentation (Coticchia and Moro 2016, pp.710-12, Hjalager 
1999, pp.23-33). 
If soldiers and officers are to feel comfortable sharing knowledge about problems in the field, 
organisational culture must also tolerate mistakes and opportunities should be created to take 
risks, communicate mistakes and learn from them (Byrne and Bannister 2013, p.82, DiBella 
2010, p.121, Edmonson 1999, Garvin et al. 2008). As Mintzberg et al (1998, p.214) highlight, 
a key dimension of a learning organisation is that it ‘fights the natural tendency to bury failure’ 
through open and frank discussion of shortcomings. In addition, personnel should be trained in 
how to provide constructive confrontation, which is important in supporting continuous 
learning (De Long and Fahey 2000, p.122, Martins and Terblanche 2003, p.72).  
A learning culture should also extend to the highest levels of an organisation (Foley et al 2011, 
p.267-68). As Weber (2007, p.336) demonstrates, lessons-learned are likely to fail if they do 
not have the support of an organisation’s leadership, which should act as a ‘role model’ in 
knowledge-sharing (Edmonson 1999, p.356, Lis 2012, pp.24-25, Marsick and Watkins 2003, 
Yong-Mi et al. 2012). Russell (2010, 201-02) also highlights the importance of the support of 
leaders on the battlefield for the free-flow of information.  
However, ensuring an organisational hierarchy’s commitment to lessons-learned is often 
difficult. Organisational hierarchies tend to be composed of individuals who are liable to 
defend approaches and concepts in which they have expertise, especially because their success 
in climbing the organisational hierarchy means that senior personnel have limited experience 
in coping with failure (Argyris 1991, 1). As Argyris (1991, 1)  highlights: ‘whenever their 
single-loop learning strategies go wrong, they become defensive, screen out criticism, and put 
the “blame” on anyone and everyone but themselves’. Hence coaching may be necessary to 
help senior personnel recognise when they exhibit defensive reasoning (Argyris 1991, 
Edmonson 1999, p.356, Garvin et al. 2008).  
The role of officers in coaching, counselling and mentoring subordinates is also vital in 
facilitating tacit knowledge socialisation (Harvey and Wilkinson 2009, p.30, Hoffmann 2016, 
p.138; Lis 2014, p.62-3). It is especially important in establishing a culture where mistakes can 
be learned form through constructive feedback (Lis 2014, p.63). Moreover, coaching, 
counselling and mentoring encourages personnel to take greater personal responsibility for 
their professional development and education (Harvey and Wilkinson 2009, p.30). The role of 
officers in encouraging continuous self-education among their subordinates is  important 
during periods of high operational pressure, when there is less time for formal education 
(Kiszely 2006, p.21, Marsick and Watkins 2003).  
Furthermore, a demonstrable commitment of the civilian and military leadership to open debate 
and constructive criticism is important in establishing an organisational culture that permits the 
communication of problems (Foley et al. 2011, p.267-68, Garvin et al. 2008, Harkness and 
Hunzeker 2015, p.7, Kiszely 2013, p.129). It helps to establish an environment of 
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‘psychological safety’ where thoughts can be expressed without fear of punishment (Edmonson 
1999, Garvin et al. 2008). As Foley et al (2011, p.267) highlight: ‘soldiers need to believe that 
the army is taking the lessons-learned system seriously or they will be less likely to engage 
positively and honestly with the process’. The support of the civilian and military leadership 
for open debate can be demonstrated in three main ways. 
First, as Jensen (2016) and Marcus (2017, p.7) recognise, ‘incubators’ play a key role in 
sustaining a culture of experimentation and creativity by providing officers with the intellectual 
freedom and time to reflect critically upon current doctrine. Incubators are ‘informal subunits 
outside of the organisational hierarchy’ and take the form of study groups or working groups 
at the Service or Joint level (Jensen 2016, p.214). While incubators are, by their informal 
nature, difficult to include in a lessons-learned process, military organisations usually have 
internal think-tanks devoted to doctrine development and concept development and 
experimentation. Hence the senior military leadership should ensure that such organisations 
receive sufficient financial support and also support the dissemination of their intellectual 
activities.  
Second, the civilian and military should hierarchy provide explicit support for military-wide 
professional publications to provide a forum open debate about tactical, operational and 
strategic level issues (Fitzgerald 2013, p.16, Foley et al. 2011, pp.267-68). Professional 
publications should also include contributions from academics, alliance partners, NGOs and 
other government departments, where relevant (Foley et al. 2011, pp.267-68). Hence the 
editorial team of such publications should include personnel most exposed to ‘disruptive 
thought’, such as officers from the lessons-learned organisation, military think-tanks and 
academics (Kiszely 2013, p.129). 
Finally, although a military requires space for experimentation and failure, failure resulting 
from unwillingness to learn should not be tolerated. It is important that the Service and Joint-
level senior leaderships can be held to account for failure to develop an environment where 
critical thought is welcomed, or for intransigence in dealing with LI. These observations 
reinforce the importance of ensuring that the military promotion process evaluates an 
individual’s commitment to self-education and values activities which contribute to the 
military’s intellectual dynamism.  
Establishing a strong culture of experimentation and creativity within an organisation improves 
overall levels of trust, which has a positive impact on knowledge-sharing (De Long and Fahey 
2000, 119).  As De Long and Fahey (2000, p.119) highlight: ‘The level of trust that exists 
between the organisation, its subunits, and its employees greatly influences the amount of 
knowledge that flows both between individuals and from individuals into the organisation’s 
databases, best-practice archives, and other records’. Numerous studies of organisational 
learning demonstrate that when organisations are characterised by teams which value shared 
trust and open communication, they are more likely to innovate (De Long and Fahey 2000, 
p.119, Martins and Terblanche 2003, pp.72-3). 
The institutional architecture of lessons-learned: making learning severe, immediate and 
personal 
The institutional architecture of lessons-learned also plays a vital role in fostering knowledge 
transformation (Garvin et al. 2008, Jones and Mahon 2012, pp.782-83, Yong-Mi et al. 2012, 
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pp.488-89). Bureaucratic politics, organisational culture and perceptions of potential personal 
reputational damage form significant obstacles to knowledge transformation (Davidson 2011, 
p.26). The institutional architecture of lessons-learned can, if designed correctly, allow an 
organisation to take important steps towards overcoming these obstacles. As one interview 
partner noted, it has the potential to make issues ‘severe – [i.e. important], immediate [i.e. 
temporally pressing] and personal [i.e. to put professional reputation at stake for failing to act 
upon emerging lessons]’ for officers or military branches/organisations.8  
The first key feature of the institutional architecture of lessons-learned is the establishment of 
a high-level review team to oversee the ‘observation’ and ‘analysis’ phases of lessons-learned 
(Gupta and McDaniel 2002, Mullin 1996, see Figure 1). Its role includes establishing the 
accuracy, relevance and value of information arising from knowledge acquisition initiatives, 
such as reports from lessons-learned staff officers in the field, after-action reviews, post-
operational interviews, post-operational reports and allied liaison officer reports (Sheremata 
2000). The team also considers the causes of problems, suggests possible remedial actions and 
decides which branches/organisations will take responsibility for resolving LI.  
The high-level review team has to make difficult decisions about the trade-off between the 
benefits of acting on an observation and the cost of action in terms of financial resources and 
time. It should, therefore, include personnel with seniority and experience who are capable of 
evaluating the accuracy, relevance and value of information in the context of current and future 
operational objectives (Foley et al. 2011, p.286). Hence personnel on the team should be 
carefully selected to maximise their breadth of expertise and experience. Ideally, substantial 
knowledge of the institutional military should be accompanied by recent operational 
experience. 
Although a large majority of military personal on the high-level team will rotate on two-to-
three year postings, the team should also include reservists or civilian personnel in permanent 
posts (Lis 2012, p.26, Sheremata 2000, p.398). Such permanent appointments permit the 
development of expertise in different military activities and strengthen the team’s ability to 
assess the quality of advice provided by other military branches/organisations during the 
analysis phase of a potential LI. Furthermore, civilian personnel help to weaken any impact 
that regimental, Service or military culture may exert on decisions about the relevance of 
information arising from the operational environment or inter-organisational learning 
activities.  
Where relevant, other government departments (OGDs), non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) and academics should also be involved in decision-making. The input of academics 
from outside the military and military history experts internal to the military helps foster greater 
objectivity in observation analysis (Kiszely 2012, p.129, Marston 2010, p.83). It is, however, 
important that a large proportion of military history experts at internal military historical 
institutes are civilians with long-term contracts in order to enhance academic freedom.9 
Specific interpretations of the lessons of previous campaigns can become dominant in 
                                                          
8 Interview partner, DACOS Warfighting, British Army Land Warfare Development Centre, Warminster, 11 July 
2017. 
9 Three interviews, Centre for Historical Analysis and Conflict Research, Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, 12 
July 2017. 
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institutions, hence it is important that opportunities are provided for contending visions of the 
lessons of history to be introduced to lessons-learned (Fitzgerald 2013, p.12).  
The second essential dimension of the institutional architecture of lessons-learned is the 
establishment of a ‘cross-functional team’ involving the leaders of the main functional teams 
within an organisation (i.e. key areas of military activity) (Piening 2013, p.229, Sheremata 
2000, p.400). A cross-functional team has several roles. First, it endorses the outcome of the 
high-level team’s analysis and formally assigns responsibility for implementing a remedial 
action to an action body. In addition, the cross-functional team ensures that an action body 
prepares and implements an appropriate plan and delivers progress reports. Finally the cross-
functional team takes overall responsibility for the periodic oversight of all phases of the 
remedial action phase: endorsement and tasking, implementation and monitoring and 
validation (see Figure 1). 
A cross-functional team’s effectiveness is dependent upon three structural factors which enable 
managers to exert influence: control over scarce resources; centrality in information networks 
and formal authority within the organisational hierarchy (Sheremata 2000, p.400). Formal 
authority derives not only from the position of the lessons-learned organisation in the military 
hierarchy, but also from cross-functional team’s membership which should include senior 
personnel from key areas of military activity (Downie 1998, p.263, Lis 2014, pp.70-71). For 
Joint-level lessons-learned, the highest levels of military leadership should participate in the 
cross-functional team. 
Furthermore, a cross-functional team should be able to draw upon the expertise of academics, 
as well as retired personnel who can provide very useful historical context to discussions. It is 
therefore, important, that exit interviews take place with officers upon their retirement and that 
their contact details are retained and updated (Kothari et al 2011, p.3). The inclusion of OGD 
and NGO representatives is also vital when discussing issues relating to the Comprehensive 
Approach. Service cross-functional team meetings should also include Joint lessons-learned 
personnel, thus allowing any issues within implications for Joint activity to be picked up. In 
addition, senior officers from other Services’ lessons processes should attend in order to 
uncover lessons which may have relevance for activity in their domain and provide an 
additional external perspective. Personnel from internal military think-tanks/incubators tend to 
be exposed to inter-organisational learning and should, therefore, also be involved in the work 
of the cross-functional team. Combined with external academics and experts from military 
history institutes these personnel have the potential to form a powerful potential ‘advocacy 
network’ on behalf of learning.  
The presence of civilians from within and outside the military on both the high-level and cross-
functional teams plays a key role in reducing the corrupting role that bureaucratic politics, 
organisational culture and perceptions of personal reputational damage can exert on learning 
processes. It is, however, important that external academics are senior and well-respected in 
their discipline. This status will not only maximise the authority of their recommendations 
among high-ranking officers, but will also enhance their confidence when ‘speaking truth to 
power’.  
Hence, if correctly implemented, a cross-functional team provides a mechanism to ensure that 
operational experiences are considered in a rigorous and critical manner. It endows change to 
organisational knowledge with authority, legitimacy and a sense of organisational consensus 
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which helps to speed the remedial action and dissemination phases of lessons-learned (Downie 
1998, p.262-63, Thomas and Allen 2006, p.124). As Downie (1998, p.262) argues: ‘The 
process for evaluation and experimentation with doctrinal assumptions cannot be incidental; it 
should be established as a vital part of a systemic process’.  
The effective alignment of responsibility and expertise for Service and Joint lessons 
The ideal type lessons-learned process developed above is not only valid not at the Service 
level, but also at the Joint level, albeit with a small number of changes. First it is important that 
high-ranking ministerial-level civil servants and senior officers from the Services participate 
in Joint level cross-functional teams. Furthermore, analysts involved in a Joint high-level team 
should be carefully selected to ensure that Service perspectives are effectively represented. 
The establishment of a separate Joint and Service lessons-learned processes is unavoidable as 
a single cross-Service lessons process organised at the Joint level would likely be viewed by 
the Services as an ‘outsider’ organisation, leading to remoteness between the lessons process 
and action bodies within the Services.10  However, creating separate Service and Joint level 
lessons-learned processes is also associated with a serious risk of misaligning responsibility 
and expertise for lessons. It is essential that responsibility for lessons is aligned with the 
authority that has the resource capability – financial, intellectual and workforce – to resolve 
problems. The Services must take responsibility for identifying and dealing with lessons which 
rightly lie within their domain, with responsibilities for the tactical and operational levels of 
military activity clearly delineated between the Service and Joint lessons processes (Dyson 
2017, p.8).  
As the Joint realm of military activity has grown in importance during the post-Cold War and 
operations are run increasingly by permanent joint headquarters, a tendency has emerged 
within NATO militaries to conflate the operational level with the Joint level and the tactical 
level with the Service level.11 Although some operations are truly joint, many operations 
involve a predominance of one Service. Locating responsibility for operational lessons at the 
Joint level runs the risk of failing to properly align of responsibility and expertise for 
operational level lessons which might better lie with an individual Service. Operational level 
learning must therefore also be an integral part of Service lessons processes, otherwise doctrine, 
officer education and training are unlikely to keep pace with changes in the operational 
environment (Alderson 2010, p.14). Furthermore, a misalignment of responsibility and 
expertise in lessons undermines accountability, thereby making it difficult for the military 
hierarchy and Ministerial level to hold personnel and organisations to account for the failure to 
act on problems (Dyson 2017, p.8).12 
The need to correctly align responsibility and expertise reinforces the importance of close 
coordination between Service and Joint lessons-learned, especially between their cross-
functional teams. Service and Joint responsibilities for doctrine development, training and 
                                                          
10 Interview, Division J357, Department for Lessons Learned, Potsdam, Bundeswehr Operations Command, 13 
April 2016; Interview, Joint Warfare, Operational Analysis and Learning, Joint Forces Command, Northwood, 
United Kingdom, 28 February 2017. 
11 Interview, former Head of British Army Mission Support Group and Afghanistan Counterinsurgency Centre, 
London, 27 February 2017. 
12 Interview, former Head of British Army Lessons Exploitation Centre and former Army Chief Safety Officer, 
Warminster, 28 February 2017. 
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education should be clearly delineated, as far as possible. The Joint level cross-functional team 
should act as a venue to ensure that any ‘grey areas’ in the alignment of responsibility and 
expertise are quickly addressed when they stand in the way of acting on LI.  
Conclusions: future empirical and theoretical research agendas on military learning 
This article has filled an important gap in our understanding of the antecedents of military 
learning by highlighting the key organisational processes and activities and processes which 
encourage effective military learning processes, especially knowledge transformation. 
However, the article also points to several theoretical and empirical research agendas which 
will be essential in developing a deeper understanding of the conditions which facilitate 
learning within military organisations.  
 
First, there is a need to improve our understanding of the mutually-constitutive relationship 
between the emergence of dynamic organisational capabilities and variables such as 
bureaucratic politics and organisational culture. As Piening (2013) and Zahra and George 
(2002, pp.195-97) note, well-developed dynamic organisational capabilities are capable of 
improving the performance of both public and private sector organisations. They enhance a 
military’s ability to uncover new trends in the operational environment and institutionalise 
successful adaptation as organisational learning in timely manner. Crucially, they have the 
potential to enable militaries to overcome the stasis that can occur as a result of organisational 
culture, bureaucratic politics and perceptions of potential personal reputation damage. Indeed, 
scholars such as Davidson (2011), Marcus (2015) and Murovec and Prodan (2009, p.862) 
highlight that once established, dynamic organisational capabilities can create a virtuous circle 
of improvement in organisational learning.  
 
However, further research is required to establish greater precision in our understanding about 
the extent to which variables such as organisational culture (especially culturally-embedded 
understandings of military professionalism) and bureaucratic politics effect and are affected by 
the emergence of dynamic organisational capabilities. Exploring this mutually-constitutive 
relationship will necessitate deeper empirical investigation of national military learning 
processes and their knowledge acquisition, management, dissemination and transformation 
activities, which have received very limited attention in the academic literature on military 
change and organisational learning. Comparative research should explore the factors which 
have facilitated and undermined the ability of lessons-learned processes to successfully 
recalibrate key areas of military activity including training, equipment, personnel, information, 
concepts and doctrine, organisational, infrastructure, logistics and operational design.13  
Furthermore, there is a great deal of scope for improvement in our understanding of best-
practice in lessons-learned. Research is required to identify relevant lessons for militaries from 
other so-called ‘High-Velocity and Turbulent Environment’ (HVTE) professions and to 
understand the factors which can facilitate and impede the establishment and success of 
learning processes. For example, many British public sector organisations involved in high-
risk, complex and rapidly-changing contexts, such as the fire and rescue services, National 
Health Service, and police forces, as well as private sector organisations including the nuclear 
industry and railways, have operated, or are developing, lessons-learned processes (Piening 
                                                          
13 For a comparative account of British and German Army and Joint-level lessons-learned, see Dyson 
(forthcoming, 2019). 
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2013, p.210).14 The British Army’s Lessons Team has attempted to engage with several of 
these organisations to identify lessons-learned best-practice. However, this potentially 
mutually-beneficial engagement has been stymied by resource constraints.15  
Comparative scholarship of HVTE professions could examine a range of issues, including best-
practice in knowledge acquisition, management, dissemination and transformation. For 
example, one especially important area for future research is how advances in knowledge 
management technology and social media can improve knowledge acquisition and 
dissemination by helping to compensate for lessons-learned personnel shortages.16 
Furthermore, future research could usefully investigate the variables which facilitate and 
undermine experimentation and creativity within HVTE professions.  
More detailed case study research on military lessons-learned is also necessary. For example, 
a thorough investigation about the role of – and relationship between – factors such as length 
of service, seniority and promotion prospects on the willingness of individuals to support 
knowledge-sharing within and between teams is necessary. Surveys, focus groups and semi-
structured interviews with military personnel from a variety of ranks within deployed 
contingents and the institutional military involved with instances of successful organisational 
adaptation/innovation would allow us to gain important insights into the conditions which 
promote learning. In addition, research from fields such as strategic management and 
psychology could identify best-practice in important sub-fields of knowledge acquisition, such 
as knowledge collection and dissemination processes.  
Furthermore, inter-organisational learning between militaries requires deeper investigation. 
Coticchia and Moro (2016) analyse the drivers of inter-organisational learning by the Italian 
Armed Forces, providing a rich understanding of the mechanisms of inter-organisational 
learning driving military change at the macro-level: jointness/multinational interoperability, 
digitalisation, and the Comprehensive approach (Coticchia and Moro 2016, 702-10). Yet, the 
role of lessons-learned as a mechanism for improving the effectiveness of inter-organisational 
learning is unexplored (Coticchia and Moro 2016, 710-12). Furthermore, research is required 
to examine the effectiveness of NATO and EU activities to stimulate the cross-national 
exchange of lessons.17 Such research will not only add greater detail to the ideal type of lessons-
learned established in this article, but will also help to provide greater clarity about the relative 
importance of the diverse components of the ideal type. 
 
The lack of academic engagement with the organisational processes and activities which 
support military learning has undermined the quality of NATO guidance on national military 
learning processes. Personnel at the JALLC have a number of competing demands on their 
time and are unable to invest sufficient time in writing the NATO Lessons-Learned Handbook, 
which neglects critical organisational activities and processes central to military learning, 
especially knowledge transformation. It is important that these conceptual gaps are remedied 
in the next (4th edition) of the Handbook, which is presently under development. Engagement 
                                                          
14 Interview, Lessons Team, Land Warfare Development Centre, Warminster, 15 December 2016. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Interview, Lessons Team, Land Warfare Development Centre, Warminster, 10 July 2017. 
17 For a preliminary exploration of knowledge management and lessons-learned within international organisations, 
see Ringel-Bickelmaier and Ringel (2010). 
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between scholars of military learning and JALLC practitioners will be essential in overcoming 
the negative impact of time constraints on the quality and depth of guidance on lessons-learned. 
An improved NATO Lessons-Learned Handbook would also likely have positive implications 
for investment in lessons-learned by NATO member states. It is an unfortunate trend that 
during periods of budgetary cuts, warfare and doctrine centres, military history research centres 
and lessons-learned organisations, which are essential supporting institutions for knowledge 
transformation, often tend suffer cuts disproportionately (Ucko and Egnell 2013, pp.126-27). 
The organisational processes and activities which support military absorptive capacity are not 
cheap to sustain, however the long-term savings which accrue from improving inter- and intra-
organisational learning far outweigh the financial outlay. Clearer and more authoritative NATO 
guidance on lessons-learned best-practice would provide a strong foundation for civilian and 
military proponents of lessons-learned to secure greater financial resource investment in 
activities which support knowledge transformation. 
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